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Abstract 
The value of conscience in healthcare ethics is widely debated. While some sources 
present it as an unquestionably positive attribute, others question both the veracity of its 
decisions and the effect of conscientious objection on patient access to healthcare. This 
paper argues that the right to conscientiously object should be broadened, subject to 
certain previsos, as there are many benefits to healthcare practice in the development of 
the consciences of practitioners. While effects such as the preservation of moral integrity 
are widely considered to benefit practitioners, this paper draws on the work of Hannah 
Arendt to offer several original arguments in defence of conscience that may more 
directly benefit patients, namely that a pang of conscience may be useful in in rapidly 
unfolding situations where there is no time to satisfactorily reflect upon our activities and 
that, given the hierarchical nature of healthcare institutions, a right to defy authority on 
the basis of conscience may benefit junior staff who lack the institutional power to 
challenge the orders of superiors.  
 
A clear case for conscience in healthcare practice. 
 
 As healthcare professionals, how should we consider the judgements of conscience? Its 
perceived irrationality, its quasi religious status and its potential for professional abuse 
have led to the idea of a professional heeding their conscience being a discreditable abuse 
of their position, like a politician who fiddles their expenses. In fact, rights to 
conscientious objection are limited; while the law recognises conscience inasmuch as it 
provides a right to conscientiously object to participation in termination of pregnancy and 
embryo research, in most other situations sustained objections have resulted in the 
dismissal of the practitioner concerned,[1, 2] and I suspect practitioners who have 
objections consequently tend to utilise other, more surreptitious, means to avoid 
participation. Conscience is thus both misconceived and invisible in healthcare but for a 
small and controversial area of the law and this bulwarks the impression that 
conscientious objection represents a straightforward dichotomy between patient choice or 
practitioner rights. While conscience has its defenders within the healthcare ethics 
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discourse, few of these bring us any closer to resolving this dichotomy in a satisfactory 
way. While not considering specific controversies, but rather focusing on the value of 
conscience per se, in this paper I attempt to improve this defence of conscience in two 
ways: By offering an analysis of the properties of conscience that seeks to breaks it down 
into its constituent parts, consciousness and voice of conscience, I seek to explore the 
workings of conscience and suggest it can be the partner of reason in the reflective 
process. Secondly, by drawing on the relatively novel theories of Hannah Arendt, I argue 
that there is an intrinsic value in the exercise of conscience by healthcare practitioners 
that can improve the quality and probity of practice and therefore have real benefits for 
both practitioners and their patients.  
 
Is practitioner conscience desirable? 
 If, as a junior member of the multi-disciplinary team, my conscience tells me to refuse to 
obey an instruction, what should I do? Certainly in current circumstances my position 
would be both legally and institutionally untenable, as cases lie on record of nurses being 
successfully dismissed due to similar refusals
a
. Yet I cannot be alone in agreeing with 
Johnstone’s,[1] observation that the idea of a nursing workforce that operated without 
conscience would be troubling, and I suggest this observation applies just as equally to 
doctors and physiotherapists. As Arendt observed in her reflections on the totalitarian 
systems of the Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia,[3], the idea of obedience in itself is a 
morally questionable activity for creatures of reason such as human beings. For these 
reasons I cannot help but feel conscience has an important part to play in the delivery of 
healthcare, and this paper is conceived as a defence of this value of conscience per se, 
rather than as a defence of conscientious objection in any specific situation. This is 
important because an overemphasis on specific instances can hamstring practical 
considerations of this value, and, while healthcare literature contains wide ranging views 
of conscience
b
, a significant section of the medical ethics discourse downplays the role of 
                                                 
a
 See for instance Warthen's case (where a nurse was dismissed for refusing further attempts to dialyse a 
terminally ill paient after previous attempts had resulted I severe complications) in Johnstone M, Taking a 
stand: conscientious objection, clinical ethics committees and whistleblowing In: Bioethics – a nursing 
perspective, 4th ed. London: Churchill-Livingstone, 2005: 325. 
b
 Although there is a notable difference in the polarity of nursing and medical views. 
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conscience as a moral arbiter, and in particular the issue of conscientious objection to 
abortion dominates. This domination is perhaps because UK law
c
 only allows overt 
expressions of conscience in the rights to object to participation in termination of 
pregnancy,[4] and embryo research,[5]. The law does not demand an explanation of the 
objection from the practitioner and in the USA similar rights have seriously impacted on 
patient access to treatment,[6]. This crisis has led to ethicists such as Savulescu,[7] taking 
positions inimical to conscientious objection in healthcare. The problem a right of 
conscientious objection creates for patients with a genuine need for services provides a 
compelling case for reform, which I shall examine in due course. However, a case for 
reform must logically be preceded by an exploration of the value of conscience in the 
workplace, as the disvaluing of conscience by Savulescu,[7] and others,[8] has been on 
the basis of its disutility. I would like to argue that this disutility is an extrinsic feature of 
how we treat conscience rather than an intrinsic feature of conscience itself. In order to 
do this I shall introduce the novel theories of Arendt, who reconsidered conscience 
through the lens of an era of extremity – the dictatorships of Hitler and Stalin - for I 
suggest these theories show that conscience is an intrinsically valuable faculty that 
contains much to commend itself to practice in the unusual circumstances of healthcare. 
 
Arendt and the intrinsic value of conscience 
 Although post-enlightenment philosophers spent much time considering the fallibility of 
conscience and its relationship to reason,[9, 10] – a relationship I shall discuss later – 
conscience has a more universal property that is independent from notions of its 
reliability; that of providing an internalised second opinion over our thoughts and actions 
that is less easily persuaded than the faculties of reason, and Hannah Arendt,[11] closely 
considered this independent property. In the aftermath of the Second World War, Arendt 
was struck that some individuals in Nazi Germany resisted the regime despite the 
overwhelming mass of the German population not just consenting, but in many cases 
actively abetting, actions that were a complete inversion of previously universal moral 
values. She noted these resistors did not stop to think what was reasonable, but instead 
                                                 
c
 I only consider UK law in this paper; however, US law is similar in this respect. The detail of the law is 
fairly unimportant as my point is that the law unduly influences the view of conscience taken by medical 
ethics commentators. 
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had something like an emotional opposition – as Arendt suggests, they did not say “I 
won’t”, but instead: “I can’t”. To Arendt this suggested a rare value of conscience in a 
crisis when normal rules had broken down. But what relevance could these revelations 
have to contemporary healthcare practice? Nazism – abhorrent and unique - is so far 
removed from anything we encounter in our lives today that Arendt’s observations are 
perhaps of anthropological or historical interest, but arguably have nothing in common 
with healthcare practice – indeed, given the great gulf between medical activities that are, 
at their best, the embodiment of humanitarian values, and a horrifying historical episode 
that is, to many, the summit of inhumanity, it may seem offensive to draw comparisons. 
Yet if we strip away our familiarity with the history of Nazism, and with the particular 
and distressing nature of its mission, and consider that it was an environment where 
normal values were suspended, a world where hierarchy and obedience became second 
nature, Arendt’s ideas have much resonance within healthcare. This is because the 
activities that routinely take place in some of the arenas of healthcare – operating theatres 
and intensive care for instance – are far removed from the normal rules that govern the 
day to day conduct of society. Practitioners in these environments face hierarchical and 
institutional pressures to conform to unfamiliar rules of conduct. Indeed it is a measure of 
the novelty of these situations that such a large area of study governs the rights and 
wrongs of its dilemmas and while this bioethics epistemology has been incorporated into 
professional guidelines, these cover by no means all ethical dilemmas of practice. 
Commonly accepted practice may not always be sufficiently scrutinised – for example 
the routine ‘treating to die’ of infants with Down’s syndrome is a relatively recent 
phenomena,[12] – or locally misinterpretated – for instance the decision to cease feeding 
an elderly woman with dementia by a General Practitioner,[13]. In both these instances 
the impetus for reform has come from practitioners who have followed their consciences 
in pressing for change. Even in instances where firm advice is available, loyalty to 
colleagues and deference to power structures and hierarchy can compete with the advice 
of professional bodies, and there are strong pressures on juniors to conform to the 
viewpoint of their superiors. These examples suggest Arendt’s ideas have relevance to 
the delivery of excellent healthcare despite the apparent incongruity of their root. 
However the intrinsic value of conscience cannot be realised in the current 
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circumstances, as I suggest there is profound disutility in the way conscience is treated in 
healthcare at present. There is a lack of openness about those decisions of conscience that 
are legally permitted that is encouraged by the lack of probity such decisions face. In 
turn, where there is no legal protection of conscience, this culture of silence is bulwarked 
by a very real fear among practitioners that they will face serious reprisals if they act on 
their consciences; the few cases on record of healthcare professionals doing so have 
resulted in dismissal,[1, 2]. This creates a climate where surreptitious avoidance of 
situations can flourish, and such surreptitious avoidance is by its very nature highly 
resistant to challenge. While the response of some critics to symptoms of disutility such 
as lack of availability of healthcare to patients requesting termination of pregnancy in the 
United States is to suggest further curtailment of already limited rights to conscientious 
expression,[7] I suggest such measures would simply drive conscience further into the 
shadows. What is needed is a wholesale reform of the way we treat decisions of 
conscience, reform that increases both probity and practitioner freedom. 
 
A case for reform – openess and probity 
 A wholesale reform of the conscientious objection in healthcare that increases the 
probity of decisions of conscience as well as the right of practitioners to express them 
would allow ill conceived objections to be challenged and areas of practice that escape 
outside scrutiny to be examined, with net benefits to practice and patient care. The 
current legal mechanisms fail to balance the benefits of allowing practitioners freedom of 
conscience with negative impact on patients, and it’s most radical critics suggest a 
curtailment of existing rights to conscientious objection is the remedy,[7]. Is further 
restricting expressions of conscience an effective solution? I suggest practitioners will 
find ways to avoid situations they find uncomfortable or unconscionable – whether 
justifiably or not. Of course the very nature of surreptitious behaviour makes empirical 
data hard to come by, however anecdotal accounts of strategies of patient avoidance 
suggest their de facto existence in day to day practice. For instance, in a commentary 
about conscientious objection, Johnstone suggests:  
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 nurses have been 'conscientiously objecting' to workplace practices for years... ...by 
sidestepping a particular patient assignment, swapping shifts, declining to work in a 
particular ward or area, or taking a 'sick day' off work...,[1]. 
 
 Similarly Zuger’s recollections of her internship in a municipal hospital at the beginning 
of the AIDS epidemic suggests the medics possess strategies for surreptitious avoidance 
of patients they find unpopular or morally challenging:  
 
The AIDS patient who never quite gets visited on morning rounds "because there's 
nothing new to say," "because all the students upset him," "because the intern will come 
back and talk to him later"…,[14] 
 
While neither commentator gives us incontrovertible proof of surreptitious avoidance on 
the basis of conscience, both examples suggest there are ample means at the disposal of 
practitioners to do so (even if, as in Zuger’s example, the avoidance is morally 
unjustifiable). If this is the case, further restrictions on the expression of conscience are 
unlikely to impact positively on the phenomena of patient abandonment, as they may be 
countered by surreptitious avoidance. While I cannot comprehend a way a determined or 
unscrupulous practitioner can be prevented from exercising such surreptitious means, I 
suggest such behaviour may be discouraged by creating an accountable framework in 
which conscientious objection can take place. Such a framework would employ a 
bipartite approach of increasing both the rights to exercise conscience and the probity of 
those decisions. By increasing the scope of legal and institutional rights to conscientious 
objection we help to bring such practices into the open, and so long as these rights are 
accompanied by increased openness among practitioners, decisions of conscience may be 
discussed, challenged and subjected to scrutiny. 
 Others have already put forward convincing arguments of this nature: Meyers and 
Woods [6] contrast the rigorous examination faced by those who conscientiously object 
to military service with the lack of probity faced by medical conscientious objectors, and 
suggest that such a system of examination within healthcare institutions would avoid 
vexatious use of conscientious objection. There is a secondary benefit to this suggestion 
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because examination boards that contain a broad variety of practitioners and lay persons 
also ensure that conscientious objectors will highlight the occasionally shadowy world of 
practice to outside challenge and scrutiny. In saying this I think particularly of notorious 
failures of medical ethics such as the Tuskegee syphilis study,[15] or the use of deep 
sleep therapy in Queensland,[16] in which professionals were trapped in a conspiracy of 
silence despite evidence of moral doubt among them. I do not claim to offer a 
programmatic strategy for convening such boards, although several bodies exist that may 
take on such work. Clinical ethics advisory committees are already skilled in offering 
ethical advice and have the broad base of lay and clinical opinion that would be 
necessary. Similarly, the elected representatives on a foundation trust’s council of 
governors may provide a broadly based group to referee conscientious objections. 
 While a bipartite strategy of increased openness and increased probity does not solve the 
problems of patient abandonment, or prevent the frivolous use of conscientious objection 
to avoid morally difficult situations, formal external examination, in requiring 
practitioners to give an account of their actions, would prompt personal reflection on the 
ethical appropriateness of their activities and the impact of their objection upon other 
staff and patients that may be missing from private avoidance. Such reflection
d
 could be 
retrospectively facilitated along the lines of the mentored supervision that is an 
established part of the practice of Social Work, Psychoanalysis and many other 
disciplines,[17, 18] for which already interest within the clinical arena,[19]. Perhaps more 
importantly, by calibrating the response to these dilemmas to openness and probity, 
practitioners may engage their moral faculties and take ownership of their activities, 
rather than hide behind untenable objections. But bringing conscience out into the open 
presents us with a potential inconsistency. Conscience is a private and insular mechanism 
and we need to adequately explain the relationship between its internal dialogue and the 
external reflective process; specifically we must understand the division of conscience 
                                                 
d
 The benefits of reflection on practice are taken as read: reflective practice is widely advocated as a 
technique of practice improvement in nursing and other helping professions, although relatively new to 
medicine (see for instance Bolton G. Reflective Practice: Writing and Professional Development. Paul 
Chapman Publishing Ltd, 2001). In particular, practitioner awareness of their actions and activities is a 
professional manifestation of the ‘examined life’ (which has advocates from Socrates to Nozick), and a 
way to analyse the successes and failures of our professional activities. Analysis of this paradigm is beyond 
the scope of this paper. 
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itself into both consciousness and a voice of conscience. In doing so I shall now contend 
that conscience is a unique faculty, quite separate from reason, that informs itself in a 
way that is responsive to the external reflective process. 
 
Reflection and the informing of conscience 
 Conscience accommodates two differing, yet inter-related concepts - voice of conscience 
as a reflex, gut feeling that something is morally wrong and consciousness as reflective 
insight into the impact of our actions,[20, 21]. This owes a great debt to Christian 
doctrine
e
 and it is perhaps unsurprising that the concept of conscience has diminished 
with the rise of secular ethics. Yet attributing this duality to conscience is not inconsistent 
with secularism, for I suggest it is not only a valid empirical observation, but that it is the 
interaction between these two modes of conscience that allows it to both develop and 
assert itself, and in so doing to exist in parallel to other sources of thought such as reason. 
This is important because the relationship between reason and conscience is a complex 
one. While post-enlightenment philosophical tradition suggests conscience is the lesser 
faculty as it is fallible to tradition and superstition,[10, 22] philosophers from Aquinas 
onward have contended that reason is itself not infallible. A more helpful approach, 
suggested by Andrew and Lindsey,[10] is to view both faculties as valid and to welcome 
the dynamic tension that sometimes exists between them – indeed, as they point out, an 
implicit overlap exists between them if we accept that notions underlying reasonableness 
contain implicit appeals to intuitive recognition of a common morality. How might this 
approach allow conscience, an insular mechanism, to be informed by the external 
reflective process I have described? 
 My suggestion is that voice of conscience - the reflex and instantaneous feeling of 
revulsion (or approbation) to a perceived moral wrong - is mediated by consciousness - 
the process by which we know our own thoughts and have something akin to a private 
dialogue with ourselves. Distress at one’s actions has an effect on this dialogue, and it is 
                                                 
e
 The source of this dual nature of voice of conscience / consciousness comes from early Christian 
philosophers, notably Saint Jerome, who, in a commentary on a biblical text, confused the Greek 
syneidêsis, (meaning “knowledge within”, to which the Latin conscientia literally corresponds) for the 
word synderesis
a
 (meaning “insight”) at a stroke lending a dual meaning to the Latin that does not exist in 
its ancient Greek equivalent. 
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consciousness where this moral distress manifests itself. This manifestation, because it is 
an introspective process, requires that we stop acting and review our activities 
retrospectively, a process that allows a dialogue with experience and reason. Conversely, 
the revulsion that manifests in voice of conscience is resolutely immune to reason. For 
consider that the voice of conscience, even when mastered by reason, still produces moral 
discomfort. This implies that voice of conscience is not in dialogue with reason any more 
than fear or love is governed by reason - it simply speaks too different a language. 
Nevertheless, voice of conscience is not frozen or incapable of influence or development, 
for it is through consciousness that it is in contact with our experiences and by conscious 
reflection on lived experiences that our voice of conscience is informed. The interface 
between consciousness and voice of conscience is thus apparent: Through consciousness 
we retrospectively consider our actions and their outcomes and through this consideration 
voice of conscience becomes accustomed to, or hardened against, them. Thus the duality 
of conscience has aspects that instantaneously judge and retrospectively review acts in a 
parallel process to reason, which explains the oddly human experience of our “head” 
telling us one thing while our “heart” tells us another. The upshot of this is that 
conscience cannot be informed by direct, contemporaneous appeals to reason, but instead 
by a process that is based upon reflection upon experience - a process that is necessarily 
retrospective. The external reflective process outlined in the previous section can thus 
provide the impetus and mental space for consciousness to stop and consider the 
experiences that drive the voice of conscience and provide an interface between the 
considerations of reason and conscience. Thus this division between “head” and “heart” 
is not an inconvenience we should aim to erase, but a dynamic process that we can aim to 
facilitate through a reflective process.  
 Conscience, then, contains both reflective and reflexive elements, that exist in dynamic 
parallel with reason. As a vital second opinion of our practice, conscience is too 
important a mental faculty for us to ignore when making moral decisions in healthcare 
and practitioners should be encouraged to listen to their consciences, rather than 
suppressing them. This is not to say we should follow our own internal compasses and 
live in a land of moral do-as-you-please. As I have explained, judgements of conscience 
must be open to challenge and explanation. Yet if I am correct and it is the reflective 
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process of consciousness by which reflexive judgements of voice of conscience are 
formed, it is reflection on our experiences, rather than appeals to reason, that will provide 
that challenge. But why is conscience so important? I now propose a number of instances 
where the properties of an active conscience identified in this paper can make unique 
contributions to meeting the multiple ethical and professional demands of the healthcare 
environment. 
 
Conscience as an asset to good practice 
 Conscience is a place in practitioner’s minds where they are shielded from the pressures 
of the healthcare environment and its relationships, obligations, ambitions and loyalties, 
all of which impact upon the decisions that they make while on duty. Because these 
pressures may result in the practitioner compromising their moral duties, it is essential the 
practitioner freely reflects on their actions from this standpoint. This process of (to turn a 
phrase) moral triangulation is essential if practitioners are to deliver their care to highest 
moral standards. This is not a revolutionary idea; the idea that conscious critical 
reflection upon our practice allows us improve and flourish as practitioners is common 
currency,[1, 23].  
 Acting against one's conscience is a discomforting experience; and some hold that it is a 
link to the core moral values that are an essential part of an individual’s sense of self - so 
called moral integrity,[24]. Breaching these core values harms that sense of self, resulting 
in a loss of self-respect, feelings of discontent, and ultimately desensitisation of the 
conscience,[9, 22, 24]. This does not just harm the practitioner; the healthcare disciplines 
require intensive partnership between the professional and their patients, and persistently 
acting against one's conscience has been identified by practitioners as resulting in burnout 
and by researchers as resulting in desensitisation to patient suffering,[25]. These 
observations suggest there are strong pragmatic benefits to allowing the expression of 
conscience. While these concepts of moral integrity and reflective practice are relatively 
well explored in the literature, I suggest there are at least two more reasons we should 
defend decisions of conscience by healthcare professionals; both owe a debt to the 
philosophical insights of Arendt,[11]. 
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 Healthcare is a deeply hierarchical institution, and individuals, particularly those who are 
relatively junior in the hierarchy, may feel significant pressure to participate in activities 
they feel are morally repugnant. I claim a right to conscientiously object protects 
individuals from participation in immoral acts they lack the institutional power to 
effectively challenge. As Arendt noted, intuitive moral opposition may at times be more 
reliable than reason or mainstream values. I suggest this is because reason and logical 
argument can be internally correct, while ignoring the immorality of an activity. 
Healthcare is an unusual environment and the morality of practice may not be easily 
discernable. Senior practitioners may dominate, and customary practice may become 
dangerously isolated from moral landmarks. Junior staff, being less accustomed and 
desensitised to the peculiarities of their environment, may have an outsider’s insight into 
the ethics of practice that more senior and experienced practitioners have lost. It is 
therefore important to remove the hierarchical obstacles to making a moral objection. 
 The voice of conscience, as a reflexive judgement of the morality of a situation, may 
have special relevance in the healthcare environment, because in the sometimes fast 
paced decision making of healthcare, its ability to instantly grab the moral attention may 
give it an important advantage over more deliberative mechanisms. Emergency medical 
and intensive care environments are at the forefront of some of the most ethically 
contentious debates, and in these environments much can hang on decisions taken in 
response to rapidly unfolding events. Even where there are moments to briefly reflect, 
reason may offer only pragmatic responses to moral dilemmas
f
. The ability to rapidly 
morally triangulate in such an environment is an important attribute of the voice of 
conscience.  
 Conscience is simply too important to ignore, and we should be no more dismissive of 
the challenge of conscience than any other mental faculty. It provides a mental space 
where practitioners can reflect upon their experiences and improve their practice; heeding 
conscience may allow them to remain sensitive to both their own and their patient’s 
needs; conscience provides a voice to moral objection that is independent of dominant 
mores and hierarchy and an instant alarm when events begin to rapidly outpace the speed 
                                                 
f
 For example, I think here of aggressive resuscitations, where patients have been “brought back to life” 
only to suffer days or weeks of futile and invasive treatment. 
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with which we can consider them. By fostering and respecting it, engaging with and 
interrogated its judgements, it will benefit practice and practitioners alike. 
 
Conclusion 
 Conscience is intrinsically valuable, but this value is overshadowed by both a treatment 
in law that provides untrammelled rights of conscientious objection in a narrow range of 
circumstances and a disregard of its value in practice that has led to the dismissal of 
practitioners for acting upon it. Both circumstances conspire to produce a situation where 
decisions of conscience lack openness and probity. The issues of patient access to 
treatment are hugely important and the current unsatisfactory situation is in need of both 
legal and institutional reform if we are to see the best aspects of conscience flourish. By 
taking measures to increase the probity of decisions of conscience while simultaneously 
extending protection to all instances of exercise of conscience, we protect patients and 
practitioners alike, shining a light into areas of practice that are far removed from the 
normal rules of societal conduct and initiating a reflective process that exposes frivolous 
grounds for conscientious objection to comment and censure. There is much to commend 
conscience as a genuinely valuable faculty in clinical decision making. Conscience 
should complement reason and a dynamic interplay between these faculties should be 
welcomed. It is a complex faculty, with both reflective and reflexive elements that 
provide it with an ability to independently inform judgements and counterbalance both 
reason and institutional and hierarchical pressures – none of which are free from gravely 
erroneous conclusions on occasion. Conscience provides a platform for reflection that is 
free from the pressures that dominate the workplace, and an ability to follow their 
conscience may protect practitioners from disengagement with their practice and the 
patients in their care. Conscientious objection can empower juniors to challenge the 
failings of a hierarchy that can be otherwise inured to challenge. The voice of conscience 
can speak instantly in situations where there is little or no time to reflect. These are 
common situations in healthcare, and the unique contribution of conscience to their 
betterment must not be disregarded. 
 The healthcare environment is highly unusual both in the activities of its practitioners 
and the moral demands such activities place upon them. Practice requires huge levels of 
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intellectual and practical skill and human ingenuity, strong leadership and high levels of 
organisation. However, these skills must be balanced by openness and probity and an 
ability to apply moral behaviour in unfamiliar and difficult situations, sometimes in the 
face of considerable vested interests to the contrary, sometimes where there is simply no 
time to think. Promoting an active conscience in practitioners is a vital if we are to rise to 
these challenges. 
 
 A clear case for conscience in healthcare practice.    Giles Birchley 




1. Johnstone M. Taking a stand: conscientious objection, clinical ethics committees and 
whistleblowing. In: Bioethics - A Nursing Perspective. 4th edn. London: Churchill-
Livingstone, 2005:324-58. 
2. Vines G. Sacked nurse takes ECT case to Europe. New Sci 1983;97:708. 
3. Arendt H. Personal responsibility under dictatorship. In: Responsibility and 
Judgement. New York, NY: Schocken Books, 2005:17-48. 
4. Great Britain. Abortion Act 1967 c.89. London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1967. 
5. Great Britain. Human Fertilization and Embryology Act 1990 c.37. (amended 2008 
c.22). London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 2008. 
6. Meyers C, Woods RD. An obligation to provide abortion services: what happens when 
physicians refuse? J Med Ethics 1996;22:115-20. 
7. Savulescu J. Conscientious objection in medicine. BMJ 2006;332:294-7. 
8. McCullough LB. The nature and limits of the physician’s professional responsibilities: 
surgical ethics, matters of conscience and managed care. J Med Philos 2004;29:3-9. 
9. Campbell A. The individual conscience. In: Moral Dilemmas in Medicine: 
Introduction to Ethics for Doctors and Nurses. London: Churchill Livingstone, 1984:14-
44. 
10. Andrew E, Lindsay P. Are the judgements of conscience unreasonable? Crit Rev Int 
Soc Polit Philos 2008;11:235-54. 
11. Arendt H. Responsibility and Judgement. New York, NY: Schocken Books, 2005. 
12. Read J, Clements L. Demonstrably awful: the right to life and the selective 
nontreatment of disabled babies and young children. J Law Soc 2004;31:482-509. 
13. Huxtable R. Withholding and withdrawing nutrition/hydration: the continuing 
(mis)adventures of the law. J Soc Welfare Fam Law 1999;21:339-56. 
14. Zuger A. AIDS on the wards: a residency in medical ethics. Hastings Cent Rep 
1987;17:16-20. 
15. Jones J. Bad Blood: The Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment. New York, NY: Free Press, 
1981. 
16. Anderson I. Nightmare on Chelmsford, Sydney. New Sci 1991;129:12. 
17. Hyrkas K, Appelqvist-Schmidlechner K, Haataja R. Efficacy of clinical supervision: 
influence on job satisfaction, burnout and quality of care. J Advc Nurs 2006;55:521-35. 
18. Hawkins P, Shohet R. Supervision in the Helping Professions. Maidenhead: Open 
University Press, 2006. 
19. Robinson J. Improving practice through a system of clinical supervision. Nurs Times 
2005;101:30-2. 
20. Svensson M. Augustine on moral conscience. The Heythrop Journal 2010;48:1-13. 
21. Baginni J, Fosl P. Conscience in: The Ethics Toolkit. London: Blackwell, 2007:16-
19. 
22. Lawrence RE, Curlin FA. Clash of definitions: controversies about conscience in 
medicine. Am J Bioeth 2007;7:10-14. 
23. Blustein J. Doing what the patient orders: maintaining integrity in the doctor patient 
relationship. Bioethics 1993;7:289-313. 
24. Wicclair MR. Conscientious objection in medicine. Bioethics 2000;14:205-27. 
 A clear case for conscience in healthcare practice.    Giles Birchley 
 16  
25. Gustafsson G, Eriksson S, Strandberg G, et al. Burnout and perceptions of conscience 
among healthcare personnel: a pilot study. Nurs Ethics 2010;17:23-38. 
 
